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JURISDICTION

When Spies Come infrom
the Cold, Are They Entitled to
Their Day inFederal Court?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 231-236. © 2005 American Bar Association.

Jay E. Grenig is a professor of
law at Marquette University
Law School in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. Prof. Grenig is coauthor of West's Federal Civil
Discovery and Disclosure
(2nd edition). He can be reached
at jgrenig@earthlink.net
or (414) 288-5377.

ISSUE
Is a federal court barred from considering due process and tort claims
that the CIA has wrongfully refused
to keep its alleged promise to provide lifetime financial assistance in
exchange for the claimants' alleged
espionage services for the CIA?
FACTS
Jane and John Doe (fictitious names
used to protect the identity of the
plaintiffs) claimed they performed
espionage activities on behalf of the
United States against a former
Eastern Bloc country for the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Does
assert that they were citizens of an
Eastern bloc country formerly considered an adversary of the United
States. While serving as a high-ranking diplomat for that country during
the Cold War, Mr. Doe says he
approached a person associated
with the United States and requested assistance in defecting to the
United States. According to the
Does, after this request was made,

CIA agents took them to a safe
house for approximately 12 hours.
They state the CIA officers
employed intimidation and coercion
to convince the Does to remain at
their diplomatic post and to spy for
the United States. The Does allege
the agents told them that, if they
agreed to spy for the United States,
the CIA would arrange for their
resettlement in the United States
and ensure their financial and personal security "for life." They further allege the agents assured them
that the assistance had been
approved at the highest level of
authority at the CIA, as required by
U.S. law.
Although they claimed they were
initially reluctant to spy for the
United States, the Does state they
eventually agreed to do what was
asked of them. The Does claim they
entered the United States under the
PL-110 Program. The PL-110
Program permits the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Attorney
(Continued on Page 232)
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General, and the Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization to
admit particular aliens for permanent residence in the interest of
national security or when admission
is essential to the furtherance of the
national intelligence mission. See 50
U.S.C. § 403h.
The Does say the CIA provided
them with false identities and backgrounds and offered to "retire" them
with financial and health benefits.
They allege the CIA provided them
with various benefits, including
health care and education. They
claim the CIA continued to assure
them that, to the extent their
earned income was insufficient to
meet their needs, they would be
supported by the CIA for the
remainder of their lives with a safety net, which was required by law.
The Does eventually settled in the
Seattle area and were initially provided with a stipend of $20,000 a
year, as well as housing and other
benefits. The stipend was later
increased to $27,000. The Does
allege the CIA provided them with
false identities, resumes, and references. After Mr. Doe obtained professional employment in 1987, the
amount of his stipend was reduced
as his salary increased. In 1989, Mr.
Doe and the CIA allegedly agreed
that once his salary hit $27,000, his
stipend would be suspended.
However, Mr. Doe says the CIA
assured him that the CIA "would
always be there" for the Does.
In 1997 Mr. Doe lost his job and was
unable to find new employment.
The Does assert they requested
assistance from the CIA, but the
CIA refused to assist Mr. Doe in
finding a new job as it had done in
the past. The Does were allegedly
informed by the CIA that it had
determined the benefits the Does
had previously been provided were
adequate compensation for the ser-

vices rendered and that further support would not be provided. The
Does were allegedly told they could
appeal this decision to the Director
of Central Intelligence.
While preparing an appeal, the
Does' counsel requested the CIA's
internal regulations governing the
appeals process as well as the regulations regarding resettled aliens.
The CIA never responded to these
requests. Other requests for access
to records or individuals within the
CIA were also either denied or
ignored by the CIA. Nonetheless,
the Does claim they filed their
administrative appeal with the
Director in late 1997. They assert
that after the Director denied this
appeal, they appealed to the Helms
Panel, a panel consisting of former
CIA officials. The Does allege the
Helms Panel recommended the CIA
provide the Does "certain benefits
... for a period not to exceed one
year, and nothing thereafter." The
payment was conditioned on the
Does' signing waivers and releases.
The Does apparently refused to sign
the documents and they did not
receive the payments recommended
by the Helms Panel.
The Does then filed suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Western
District of Washington, asserting
claims under the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses. The Does'
complaint requested that the court
require the CIA to resume payment
of the benefits allegedly promised
and provide constitutionally adequate internal review procedures.
The government moved to dismiss
the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and for failure to state a
claim. The district court denied the
government's jurisdictional motion,
finding that the rule announced by
the Supreme Court in Totten v.
United States, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 105
(1875), did not prohibit the court
from entertaining the suit. The

court determined that the trial
could proceed despite the alleged
existence of a secret agreement, and
that any materials involving national security interests could be adequately protected by submission
under seal or by in camera review.
The district court also rejected the
government's contention that the
Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. § 1346)
required the case to be heard in the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims. The
district court reasoned that,
although the Does' request for
injunctive relief may have included
a directive that the CIA resume payments, the Does were not seeking
solely a monetary damages judgment. The district court concluded
that the Does had stated both substantive and procedural due process
claims, even apart from the existence of any alleged secret contracts
with the CIA. The district court
found that the Does may be able to
base their entitlement to a CIA
stipend on theories other than contract, such as promissory or equitable estoppel, or a regulatory or
statutory basis. The court also
found that the Does had sufficiently
stated due process claims on two
separate theories-that the CIA had
placed the Does in danger, and that
the CIA had created a special relationship with the Does. Doe v.
Tenet, 99 F.Supp.2d 1284
(W.D.Wash. 2000).
The government later renewed its
motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and moved for
summary judgment. The district
court denied these motions and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit granted an interlocutory
appeal.
The Ninth Circuit held that under
the Tucker Act, the district court
lacked jurisdiction to entertain due
process claims based on contract.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that issues

Issue No. 4

of fact existed as to whether the
CIA's failure to provide continued
support deprived the Does of a liberty interest or placed them in danger.
The court held that issues of fact
existed as to whether deprivation of
support violated requirements of 50
U.S.C. § 403h and whether the Does
were deprived of due process under
CIA regulations. The court also held
that issues of fact existed as to
whether estoppel applied to bar the
CIA's defense.
Finally, the court held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the Does' due process
claim despite the CIA's assertion
that all matters related to their espionage activities were classified.
First, the Ninth Circuit reasoned
that unlike Totten, the Does do not
seek only enforcement of a contract. Rather their principal concern
is to compel fair process and application of substantive law to their
claims within the CIA's internal
administrative process. Second, the
Ninth Circuit stated that Totten
assumed "publicity" inconsistent
with the implicit promise of secrecy
was inherent in any judicial proceeding and did not consider
whether there are means to conduct
judicial proceedings without unacceptable attendant "publicity." The
court explained that, since Totten,
courts have developed means of
accommodating asserted national
security interests in judicial proceedings while remaining mindful
that there are circumstances in
which no special procedure will be
adequate to protect those interests.
To the extent that a court can proceed without generating public
exposure, the Ninth Circuit said it
may be possible to fulfill any secrecy promise implicit in the agreement. Doe v. Tenet, 329 F.3d 1135
(9th Cir. 2002).
The government asked the Supreme
Court to review the Ninth Circuit's

decision. The government did not
seek review of the portion of the
Ninth Circuit's decision holding that
summary judgment was not proper
on the issue whether the Does' due
process claims arose from a statute
or the CIA's regulations, because
"further proceedings including discovery," may provide support for a
due process interest that exists
independent of a contract. The
Supreme Court granted the government's petition for review. 124 S.Ct.
2908 (2004).
CASE ANALYSIS
In Totten v. United States, 92 U.S.
105 (1875), the estate of William
Lloyd, a spy hired by President
Abraham Lincoln to gain information about Confederate troop positions during the Civil War, brought
suit in the U.S. Court of Claims to
recover compensation Lloyd had
allegedly been promised under his
secret agreement with the president. Holding the case was not justiciable, the Supreme Court
explained:
The service stipulated by the
contract was a secret service; the
information sought was to be
obtained clandestinely, and was
to be communicated privately;
the employment and the service
were to be equally concealed.
Both employer and agent must
have understood that the lips of
the other were to be forever
sealed respecting the relation of
either to the matter. This condition of the engagement was
implied from the nature of the
employment, and is implied in all
secret employments of the government in time of war, or upon
matters affecting our foreign relations, where a disclosure of the
service might compromise or
embarrass our government in its
public duties, or endanger the
person or injure the character of
the agent. If upon contracts of

such a nature an action against
the government could be maintained in the Court of Claims,
whenever an agent should deem
himself entitled to greater or different compensation than that
awarded to him, the whole service in any case, and the manner
of its discharge, with the details
of dealings with individuals and
officers, might be exposed, to the
serious detriment of the public. A
secret service, with liability to
publicity in this way, would be
impossible; and, as such services
are sometimes indispensable to
the government, its agents in
those services must look for their
compensation to the contingent
fund of the department employing them, and to such allowance
from it as those who dispense
that fund may award. The secrecy which such contracts impose
precludes any action for their
enforcement. The publicity produced by an action would itself
be a breach of a contract of that
kind, and thus defeat a recovery.
Totten, 92 U.S. at 106-07.
Relying on Totten, the government
asserts that it has long been established that spies have no entitlement to sue to enforce their secret
contracts for espionage services performed on behalf of the president. It
claims that the government may
even deny any relationship in the
event the spying arrangement
becomes exposed or suspected.
According to the government, the
fundamental underpinning of Totten
is the principle that such a suit
inevitably would lead to the disclosure to the existence of the agreement, contrary to both the inherently secret nature of the agreement
and the nation's overriding interests
in effective national security and
foreign relations.

(Continued on Page 234)
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The government also argues that
Totten reflects the principle that
judicial adjudication of claims by
alleged former spies who are dissatisfied with the terms of an espionage relationship would severely
intrude on the constitutional role of
the executive branch to conduct
espionage activities and to safeguard
information whose disclosure would
harm the nation's interests. It is the
government's position that those
paramount considerations give rise
to Totten's categorical and jurisdictional bar to suits alleging the CIA
has wrongfully failed to compensate
a spy for the spy's espionage activities or otherwise violated the terms
of the espionage agreement.
According to the government, the
Does' suit should have been dismissed under the rule of Totten. The
government reasons that the suit
alleges the existence of an espionage
relationship and alleges the CIA
failed to keep its promises to the
Does. Although the Does' suit is
framed in estoppel and constitutional terms, the government contends
that all their claims are premised on
the existence of an espionage agreement-an agreement that necessarily included an implicit term that the
agreement was not judicially
enforceable because it would forever
remain secret.
The Does argue that they are simply
seeking to compel the CIA to provide a procedurally fair hearing
within the CIA for their claims of
assistance and personal security,
and a declaration that the CIA is
required to comply with substantive
law in addressing these claims. The
Does point out that they have taken
every precaution to avoid disclosure
of state secrets, pointing out that
the CIA has pre-approved all filings.
The Does argue that the Ninth
Circuit correctly rejected the CIAs
position that dismissal is required
simply because a case touches on a
covert relationship.

Totten also contains an early expression of the evidentiary state-secrets
privilege: "[Plublic policy forbids
the maintenance of any suit in a
court of justice, the trial of which
would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself
regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated." Totten, 92
U.S. at 107. To invoke the state
secrets privilege, a formal claim of
privilege must be "lodged by the
head of the department which has
control over the matter, after actual
personal consideration [of the evidence] by that officer." United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1953). After that, the court determines whether the circumstances
are appropriate for the claim of
privilege. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8. In
Reynolds, the Supreme Court
emphasized that judges must carefully review assertions of the state
secrets privilege before approving
the privilege. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at
9-10. Before approving the application of the privilege, the court must
be convinced by the agency that
there is a reasonable danger that
military or national secrets will be
revealed. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 1011. The state secrets privilege is an
absolute privilege and cannot be
overcome by a showing of necessity.

While the government insists the
case necessarily will reveal state
secrets if it goes forward, the Does
say the CIA has chosen not to assert
the state secrets privilege, preferring, instead, to advocate a different
and previously unrecognized rule
that would deprive the courts of
subject matter jurisdiction based
solely on the CIA's unilateral and
conclusory assertion that disclosure
of state secrets is inevitable. The
Does point out that both the district
court and the Ninth Circuit found it
was not inevitable that the state
secrets would be revealed if the case
went forward.

The government argues that the
Ninth Circuit critically erred in
holding that Totten's categorical bar
has been superseded by the state
secrets privileges articulated in
Reynolds. The government asserts
that the Supreme Court in Reynolds
confirmed that Totten continues to
pose a jurisdictional bar "where the
very subject matter of the action
[is] a contract to perform espionage." Citing Weinberger v.
CatholicAction of Hawaii/Peace
Education Project, 454 U.S. 139
(1981), the government says that
since Reynolds, the Court has
viewed Totten as imposing a juris-

Declaring that they do not dispute
the government's right to assert the
state secrets privilege or the significant deference to which such an
assertion would be entitled, the Does
say they "dispute the existence of a
wholly different rule that defines
another land of Governmental 'sayso' ... where absolute authority is
demanded by the Government based
on nothing more than its assertion
that a blanket rule of dismissal is
necessary." Rejecting the government's protests that the state secrets
privilege is inadequate to protect
national security and that compliance with the privilege would
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dictional bar that "forbids the maintenance of any suit" to recover
claims that would inevitably lead to
the disclosure of classified information. The government also contends
that Reynolds makes abundantly
clear that in such cases the issue of
a state secrets privilege is not to be
litigated. Rather, the government
says "[t]he action [ils dismissed on
the pleadings without ever reaching
the question of evidence."
Accordingly, the government says
there is no basis for requiring it in
every case to demonstrate that the
disclosure of an espionage agreement risks harm to our national
security and foreign relations.

Issue No. 4

improperly interfere with the other
duties of the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Does assert there is
not a shred of support in the record
for those propositions.
According to the Does, Reynolds
recognizes that there may be
instances in which it is so obvious to
the court that a case cannot proceed
without disclosing the state secrets
that the privilege may be upheld on
the pleadings. However, the Does
argue that nowhere does Reynolds,
or any decision of the Supreme
Court, including Totten, authorize
the executive branch to force dismissal of a case based on nothing
more than its conclusory assertion
that dismissal is necessary. The
Does assert that Reynolds makes it
clear that it is a judicial function to
determine whether a given case may
proceed without public revelation of
state secrets. They recognize that
the judiciary must give appropriate
deference to the executive branch in
making this determination, but it
cannot abdicate this responsibility
to the executive.
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592
(1988), involved a suit by a CIA
employee who was engaged in clandestine activities. The employee was
allowed to go forward with his constitutional challenge to the CIA's
denial of his security clearance. The
Supreme Court recognized that
issues of national security could
arise in the course of the litigation,
necessitating special litigating procedures. The Court instructed the
district court to control any discovery process that may be instituted
so as to balance the employee's
need for access to proof supporting
a constitutional claim against the
extraordinary needs of the CIA for
confidentiality and the protection of
its methods, sources, and mission.
The government points out that
Webster involved a CIA employee

and did not involve an alleged espionage source who had entered into
a covert agreement with the CIA
and its case officer. According to the
government, the national security
implications and the historical treatment of the two situations are
meaningfully different. In the former case, the government says that
acknowledgment of the mere existence of an employment relationship with the CIA, along with other
details of that relationship, generally
may be, and has been, revealed in a
lawsuit, without compromising
national security. Thus, as long as a
covert CIA employee's name is not
identified, the government states
that certain aspects of the employee's activities (such as the officer's
pay or rank) may not necessarily
expose classified information.
In the case of a nonemployee espionage agent, the government argues
that the CIA has determined that
different considerations of national
security and foreign relations are
implicated if the CIA were to confirm or to deny the existence of a
human intelligence source recruited
by a CIA case officer to steal the
secrets of an enemy. In that class of
cases, the government claims there
is generally no aspect of an espionage relationship that can be
revealed, including confirmation or
denial of the relationship's existence.
Moreover, the government says that
a complaint by an espionage agent
seeking additional or different compensation than that awarded by the
CIA cannot proceed without disclosure of classified facts, including the
relationship's existence and the
details of that relationship.
The Does assert the CIA's position is
particularly untenable because they
are asserting constitutional claims.
They point out that in Webster the
Court noted the "serious constitutional question" that would arise
from the denial of "any judicial

forum for a colorable constitutional
claim."
SIGNIFICANCE
The United States has always
employed spies to serve its foreign
relations and national security
interests. These arrangements are
inherently secret. In Doe, the
Supreme Court is asked to determine what function the judicial
branch is to play when the executive branch says that a case cannot
proceed because it involves state
secrets. The Court has the opportunity to consider whether the executive branch has absolute authority
to demand that a case be dismissed,
based on the executive branch's
assertion that dismissal is necessary
for national security reasons.
As illustrated by Totten and the later decisions involving persons
engaged in espionage-related activities, the Supreme Court has sought
to balance the need for secrecy and
national security with the requirements of due process. See also
Department of Navy v. Egan, 484
U.S. 518 (1988) (noting the reluctance of the courts "to intrude upon
the authority of the Executive in
military and national security
affairs").
Last term, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
124 S.Ct. 2633 (2004), a divided
Supreme Court ruled that due
process required that a United
States citizen being held as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest factual
basis for his detention. In that case,
the government moved to dismiss
the case. Attached to the motion
was a declaration from a "Special
Advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy" who claimed to
have been "substantially involved
with matters related to the detention of enemy combatants in the
current war against al Qaeda terror(Continued on Page 236)
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ists and those who support and harbor them (including the Taliban)."
The district court found that the
advisor's declaration fell "far short"
of supporting Hamdi's detention. It
criticized the generic and hearsay
nature of the affidavit, calling it "little more than the government's 'sayso.' " The district court ordered the
government to turn over numerous
materials for in camera review,
including copies of all Hamdi's statements and the notes taken from
interviews with him that related to
his reasons for going to Afghanistan
and his activities there.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court, holding that the district court
had failed to extend appropriate deference to the government's security
and intelligence interests. The
Fourth Circuit concluded that the
factual averments in the advisor's
declaration, if accurate, provided a
sufficient basis upon which to conclude the President had constitutionally detained Hamdi. 316 F.3d
450 (4th Cir. 2002).
The Supreme Court reversed the
Fourth Circuit, holding that due
process demands that a citizen held
in the United States as an enemy
combatant be given a meaningful
opportunity to contest the factual
basis for that detention before a
neutral decision maker. The Court
recognized that the national security underpinnings of the " 'war on
terror,' although crucially important, are broad and malleable."
The Government argued that a
court should consider the basis for
Hamdi's detention, as set forth in
the advisor's declaration, and assess
only whether that articulated basis
was a legitimate one. Hamdi argued
that an individual challenging his
detention may not be held at the
will of the executive without
recourse to some proceeding before

a neutral tribunal to determine
whether the executive's asserted
justifications for that detention have
a basis in fact and warrant in law.
The Supreme Court stated that both
of these positions highlight legitimate concerns and that both
emphasize the tension that often
exists between the autonomy that
the government asserts is necessary
to pursue effectively a particular
goal and the process a citizen contends he is due before being
deprived of a constitutional right.
The Court explained that the mechanism it uses for balancing such
serious competing interests and for
determining the procedures necessary to ensure that a citizen is not
"deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" is
weighing "the private interest that
will be affected by the official
action" against the government's
asserted interest, "including the
function involved" and the burdens
the government would face in providing greater process.
Once again, the Supreme Court is
called on to balance the competing
national security interests of the
government with the due process
rights of citizens. Although this case
arises from activities during the
Cold War, it will certainly have an
impact on cases arising out of the
war on terror.
ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For John Doe and Jane Doe
(Steven W. Hale, Perkins Coie LLP
(206) 359-8000)
For George T. Tenet, individually,
John E. McLaughlin, Acting
Director of Central Intelligence and
Acting Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the United
States of America et al. (Paul D.
Clement, Acting Solicitor General
(202) 514-2217)
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